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on guerrilla warfare during the late 1960s. Guillén's theory developed from his personal experience during the Spanish Civil War and bore the deep influence of the popular theories of guerrilla warfare, including Mao Tsetung's protracted popular war and Ernesto "Che" Guevara's foquismo theory. Guillén's theory became very influential within Latin America from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. His writings, most notably the Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla, also influenced guerrillas in the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. However, not much has been written about Guillén's theory. Indeed, urban guerrilla theories in general have been discredited as a concept that has never succeeded in practice. Despite the general lack of research devoted to him, it is still worthwhile determining the strengths and weaknesses of Guillén's theory on urban guerrilla warfare and to explore the implications of his theory. This is especially so when considering the forecasted trends that will shape the complex environment, such as megacities, United States forces are likely to operate within in the future. Abraham Guillén's theory of urban guerrilla warfare provides a relevant blueprint for guerrilla warfare in the contemporary operating environment and understanding it more fully will become increasingly useful for counterinsurgents in the future. The strategy of revolutionary war is essentially political: if it does not begin with a broad front of liberation, the guerrillas will lose the war strategically, regardless of tactical successes, from failure to obtain the support of the great mass of the population of an underdeveloped country. Abraham Guillén, 1966 1 Major Research Question
SUBJECT TERMS
At the height of the development of guerrilla warfare theory in 1971, RAND analyst Brian M. Jenkins stated, "no great theorist of urban guerrilla warfare has appeared. There is no
Mao of the city." 2 To be sure, Abraham Guillén may not be as influential as Mao Tse-tung, however his theory on guerilla warfare marked a significant evolution from popular theories during the late 1960s, fusing the classic rural strategy with the urban strategy. Guillén's theory developed from his personal experience during the Spanish Civil War and bore the deep influence of the popular theories of guerrilla warfare, including Mao Tse-tung's protracted popular war and Ernesto "Che" Guevara's foquismo theory. However, not much has been written about Guillén's theory. Indeed, urban guerrilla theories in general have been discredited as a concept that has never succeeded in practice. Despite Jenkins's dismissal of Guillén and the general lack of research devoted to him, it is still worthwhile determining the strengths and weaknesses of Guillén's theory on urban guerrilla warfare and to explore the implications of his theory. This is especially so when considering the forecasted trends that will shape the complex environment, such as megacities, United States forces are likely to operate within in the future. Abraham
Guillén's theory of urban guerrilla warfare provides a relevant blueprint for guerrilla warfare in 1 Abraham Guillén, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillén, trans. and ed. by Donald C. Hodges (New York: William Morrow, 1973) , 253.
2 Brian M. Jenkins's reference to a "Mao of the city" is in recognition of the widely held belief that Mao Tse-tung's theory for protracted popular revolution is one of the most influential theories of guerrilla warfare. Brian Michael Jenkins, An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1975) , 3. the contemporary operating environment and understanding it more fully will become increasingly useful for counterinsurgents in the future.
Significance of the Research Question
Abraham Guillén's theory was influential at the time of his writing from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. Guillén was the chief strategist for the Movimiento de Liberacion NacionalTupamaros (MLN-T), one of the earliest urban-based guerrilla group that operated in Montevideo, Uruguay from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. 3 His writings, most notably the Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla, influenced guerrillas in the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. 4 Most famously, it influenced the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) strategy in Northern Ireland during the 1970s. Through the 1960s, the PIRA had attempted to employ a rural strategy influenced by the protracted popular war and foquismo theories. After experiencing political and military failure, the PIRA adjusted their practicing strategy to a more urban-based strategy espoused by Guillén. 5 It reorganized from a conventional military hierarchy to a cellular based network as prescribed by Guillén and acknowledged that his theory of guerrilla warfare was designed for the Chinese experience, he believed his theory provided a universal framework that could be applied anywhere in the world.
While formulating his theory for guerrilla warfare, Mao writes, "we must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China in her present anti-Japanese war but will be worldwide. In the early 1960s, Ernesto "Che" Guevara developed the foquismo theory. Unlike Mao, who developed his theory of action when available theory failed, Che developed the foquismo theory based largely on his observations and reflections of the Cuban Revolution. His theory can be broken down into three principles: popular forces can win against the army, the insurrection can create conditions for revolution, and the countryside is the best area for waging an insurgency. 40 Like Mao, his theory was peasant-based, rural, and protracted across three phases.
However, unlike Mao, Che did not think it was necessary to develop the political base that was the cities, which draws the population from the countryside. Understanding his neo-Marxist worldview, he believed that capitalism enabled the gradual monopolization of enterprises, placing wealth and political power in the hands of few. 53 Guillén believed that capitalist driven urbanization coupled with large population growth would create the motivation and epicenter of future insurgencies.
Guillén recognized that Mao and Che did not anticipate increased urbanization and the rising importance of the city and that the improved counter insurgency strategies were specifically designed to counter their theories, which contributed to the failure of many rural insurgencies. The recognition of these two factors prompted Guillén to develop an evolved theory for guerrilla warfare. His theory can be broken down into four principles: primacy of politics, requirement for necessary conditions, urban and rural integration, and a phased and protracted approach.
Primacy of Politics
Guillén understood the primacy of politics and the need to build a popular base of support. Guillén writes "the strategy of revolutionary war is essentially political: if it does not begin with a broad front of liberation, the guerrillas will lose the war strategically, regardless of tactical successes, from failure to obtain the support of the great mass of the population of an Guillén describes the state as a system of production with laws of population and social division of labor. Guillén believes that wherever capital accumulates, the population is drawn and bound to wage-labor, the law of population. 66 In Latin America, as elsewhere, capital accumulates in the city, making it the center of gravity for the incumbent regime. 67 The law of social division of labor refers to the relationship between the city and countryside, in which the city manufactures goods that generate capital, as the countryside provides the raw materials, such as food and natural resources, which sustain the city and enable production. While the countryside can exist without the city, the city as the point of industry cannot exist without the countryside. 68 Ultimately, the government depends on the accumulation of wealth in the cities and must sustain the system of production.
Surveying this construction, Guillén's theory of guerrilla warfare seeks to exploit these two laws, requiring both urban and rural efforts. According to the Spaniard, the urban guerrilla mobilizes through political activity the urban population alienated by the effects of capitalism in order to disrupt the system of production at the point of industry, the government's center of gravity. Meanwhile, the rural guerrilla provides a supporting but critical effort by attacking the flow of materials into the city, further disrupting the system of production. Faced by these threats, 66 Guillén, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, 236-237. In a war of liberation the final victory is not decided by arms, as in imperialist wars. In revolutionary war that side wins which endures longest: morally, politically, and economically. In the old strategy the factors making for victory were firepower and the number of combatants; in revolutionary war, if one knows how to employ strategically the factors of time and space with the support of the population, the side that knows how to or can endure the longest will ultimately win. A praetorian army which oppresses and self colonizes its own people will never achieve victory but rather the most definitive and crushing defeat, that is, should it be forced to engage in small battles, compelled to waste away and to become demoralized by the time factor, and forced to strike in the void by the guerrillas rational and strategic employment of the factor of space.
71
Assuming a disadvantage in force, Guillén envisions a strategy "as Fabius did against Hannibal" that stresses avoiding decisive conflict by trading space for time to build strength and wear down the adversary.
72
To illustrate how the insurgency should be conducted in time and space, Guillén describes three phases. In the first phase, Guillén assumes the guerrillas are at a disadvantage to the incumbent in factors of force, preventing the guerrillas from being able to seize and retain 69 Guillén, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, 239. Building broad coalitions is one of Guillén's most significant theoretical strengths.
Guillén is one of the few guerrilla theorists who addresses the importance of building broad coalitions stating "if [revolutionary war] does not begin with a broad front of liberation, the guerrillas will lose the war strategically, regardless of tactical successes, from failure to obtain the support of the great mass of the population." 97 Guillén categorizes the population into five classes: the workers, peasants, proletarianized middle class, native bourgeoisie, and landed oligarchy. 98 Like other insurgent theorists, he includes the peasants, workers, and students as a base for a broad front. However, unlike the other theorists, particularly those inspired by Marxism, Guillén stresses the inclusion of segments of the bourgeoisie, Parsa's capitalists, that are reliant on the market but oppose foreign competition. 99 Guillén goes so far as to say that nationalism should be the ideological rallying call, as opposed to more radical socialist views 94 Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions, [240] [241] Ibid., 262-275. Restricted use of terrorism can be considered a theoretical strength of Guillén's. Guillén believes that terrorism is an important element in insurgency. 103 He states that terrorism must be synchronized with other tactics in a wider strategy that pursues political effects. 104 More importantly, he writes, "it is impolitic to make a show of their [the government and security 100 Guillén, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, 259.
101 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, xvii. 102 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) was a Maoist-based guerrilla movement that attempted to overthrow the government of Peru with a communist regime in the 1980s. The Shining Path is infamous known for its excessive employment of violence and brutality. Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, [104] [105] [106] forces] crimes for the purpose of creating a climate of terror, insecurity, and disregard for basic human rights. A popular army that resorts to unnecessary violence that is not a symbol of justice, equity, liberty and security, cannot win popular support in the struggle against a dehumanized tyranny."
105 Throughout his writing, Guillén consistently reinforces the need for the insurgency to control violence in order to enhance and sustain legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
Guillén criticizes the Tupamaros for their failure to restrict the use of terrorism. Initially, in accordance with his theory, the Tupamaros restricted their use of terrorism and were perceived as legitimate by the population. This is partly because of their ingenious use of political violence.
Although they conducted many kidnappings and bank robberies, they did not utilize violence against civilians. During a bank robbery, a Tupamaro performed first aid on a civilian who fainted. Kidnapping targets were typically members of the government or security forces accused of corruption or incompetence. 106 They were released unharmed after damning confessions were taped and broadcast to the population. This fostered a positive image for the organization and fueled their initial popularity. Their use of assassinations was restricted to those personnel within the security forces that employed torture or assassination. For a variety of reasons by 1968, the Tupamaros began to utilize terror tactics more indiscriminately. Guillén specifically criticizes the kidnapping and execution of Dan Mitrione, a US advisor to Uruguay. The act, he claims, was politically void, turned the media against the Tupamaros, and branded the organization as assassins. 107 Guillén warns insurgents to avoid violent actions against the population that may bring about some tactical success, as these incidents can have disastrous strategic consequences.
Availability of Sanctuary
Connable and Libicki determined that "sanctuary-voluntary, involuntary, external or internal-is a fundamental provision for the insurgent," and that there is a strong correlation between a lack of sanctuary and insurgent defeat. 108 Of the insurgencies analyzed, only three of 22 insurgencies that did not have sanctuary were successful. One of the successful insurgencies was the Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro and his rural foco did not have access to external sanctuary and were largely trapped within the Sierra Maestra, a mountain range in southeastern Cuba. Castro's success, despite a lack of sanctuary, was only possible because the Batiste regime was so militarily ineffective. 109 Connable and Libicki also determined that every urban insurgency without sanctuary failed to achieve all of their objectives. 110 This is largely attributed to the fact that groups without sanctuary to base headquarters, supply depots, and training areas are severely handicapped in their ability to transition beyond the small scale guerrilla warfare If a country oppressed by tyranny has high-mountain and forest zones, however, there is a double possibility of attacking the enemy in the cities and mountains. Under these conditions and in order that the city may not become an immense prison for recognized revolutionaries, those whose names and photos have been given publicity should take to the mountains and carry on the struggle in liberated or semi liberated terrain, which would constitute for them a kind of liberation.
116
Guillén clearly sees value in the establishment of sanctuary in the rural areas, not just for rural operations, but in support of urban operations, where establishing sanctuary is dangerous.
However, writing on the topic of sanctuary is sparse and Guillén contradicts himself on its importance.
External Support The impact of rapid population growth and urbanization coupled with poor governance and overextended security forces creates ungoverned spaces from which guerrillas can operate relatively freely. The United States is already concerned with ungoverned space in Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, Libya, Algeria, and Sudan, which currently host several violent extremist organizations that threaten regional stability. 134 With fragile states unable or unwilling to cope with the services and security demands created by population growth in cities, ungoverned spaces will provide internal sanctuary within the city; mitigating a theoretical weakness of Guillén's theory for urban guerrilla warfare.
Globalization
Globalization refers broadly to the increasingly interconnectedness of the global community. 135 In no other area is this more pronounced than in the realm of communications.
One of the most important instruments of any insurgent organization is its means of communication. As a relatively new technology, the internet and the tools it provides have dramatically increased the ability of insurgents to communicate not only to wide audiences, but also within themselves. The internet facilitates the distribution of propaganda to a global audience and recruitment from a global pool. It enables fund raising through donation as well as legitimate and criminal business enterprises. The internet provides access to a wealth of information useful in planning attacks, virtual classrooms to train new recruits, and an effective medium to coordinate operations. The global connectivity of the internet does all of the above in an unregulated, easily accessible, cheap environment that allows insurgents to remain anonymous. 136 Guillén, and urban guerrillas in general, are criticized for not reconciling the need to operate covertly while conducting the political activities that, as Guillén states, are paramount to success. 137 However, advances in communications will enable urban guerrillas to communicate with wide audiences and among each other while remaining anonymous; overriding criticisms of develop an evolved theory for guerrilla warfare that emphasized the primacy of politics, requirement for necessary conditions, urban and rural integration, and a protracted and phased approach. His theory became very influential within Latin America by the early 1970s. His writings, most notably the Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla, also influenced guerrillas in the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Middle East.
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There is general consensus among experts that urban guerrilla warfare is a flawed and irrelevant concept. O'Neill states, "with the exception of South Yemen in 1967, the urban-warfare strategy has been ineffective." 142 Joes concludes, "nowhere in the twentieth century has urban guerrilla warfare achieved an unambiguous success." 143 The experts are correct in their analysis of urban insurgencies; however, the failure of the urban strategy in practice has been unfairly transferred to the urban theorists.
Using five consistent trends that correlate with successful insurgencies, Guillén's theory demonstrates more strengths that weaknesses. Guillén's theoretical strengths include: advocating an urban/rural hybrid that accounts for demographics and environment, restricted employment of terrorism, and emphasis on coalition formation. Guillén's theoretical weaknesses include little discussion on sanctuary and the complete absence of any discussion on the necessity of external support. Recognizing theoretical weaknesses, Guillén's theory of urban guerrilla warfare still provides a valuable blueprint for executing an effective insurgency. 
